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Rosenfeld: An Essay in Support of the Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel

ARTICLE
AN ESSAY IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S DECISIONS IN MARSHEL v. AFW
FABRIC CORP. AND GREEN v. SANTA FE
INDUSTRIES
Mordecai Rosenfeld*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Since the time to which the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary the human animal has been full of cunning and
guile." The quote is not from an itinerant fundamentalist
preacher damning the devil in rural Tennessee, but from the
heretofore secular United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Green v. SantaFe Industries.' Both Green and a closely
related decision, Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,2 have stirred the
usually staid world of corporation law. In recent years the federal
courts, reflecting the general perspective of a conservative national administration, have tended to narrow the scope of the
federal securities laws by limiting the federal rights of shareholders.3 In that context, Marshel and Green represent a sharp depar* A.B., 1951, Brown University; LL.B., 1954, Yale University. Member of the New
York Bar. The author practices law in New York City. He is involved in at least one
litigation that would be benefited if the court of appeals' decisions in Green v. Santa Fe
Indus. and Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. are not reversed.
1. 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1976) (No. 75-1753).
2. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded 45 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1976) (No. 75-1782). The Court remanded to the Second Circuit to consider whether
the case is now moot.
3. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976) (scienter required to establish certain violations of Rule lOb-5); United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (corporation, not having shown irreparable harm, could not enjoin a purchaser of more than five percent of its outstanding stock
from voting such stock even though the purchaser had not complied with the filing requirements of the Williams Act, § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only actual purchaser or seller of securities has
standing to bring private damage claim under Rule 10b-5); City of Detroit v. Grinnell,
495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (limiting the award of counsel fees in class actions); Gordon
v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd, 498 F.2d
1303 (2d Cir. 1974), afl'd, 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (fixed commissions as charged for certain
New York Stock Exchange transactions do not violate §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act).
Compare these cases with decisions of the Warren Court, such as Mills v. Electric
Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), where the Court held that a good claim is pleaded
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ture from the current trend. The Second Circuit characterized the
two opinions as ones of "extraordinary importance" and asked
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.' The purpose of this article
is to demonstrate not only that Green and Marshel are consistent
with the common law development of the past 50 years, but also
that they correctly reflect the underlying purpose of the federal
securities laws.
A.

II. THE
The Concord Merger

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Concord Fabrics, Inc. ("Concord")' was a private corporation
owned by two brothers, Frank and Alvin Weinstein. In 1968, the
Weinsteins did what many other large family businesses were
doing: they "went public." Concord sold 300,000 of its shares to
the public that year at $15 per share.6 The next year the Weinsteins sold an additional 200,000 Concord shares from their own
personal accounts to the public, this time at $20 per share.7 As a
result of those sales, the Weinstein family holdings were reduced
to 68 percent of Concord's outstanding stock; the Weinstein coffers were increased by $4 million. In February 1975, when Concord's stock was selling at about $2 per share on the American
Stock Exchange, the company nimbly reversed its field and announced that it was now "going private;" all public shares would
be purchased at $3 per share.' Those who were dissatisfied were
advised that they could pursue their remedy in an appraisal proceeding pursuant to section 910 of the New York Business Corporation Law.
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act if it is alleged that the challenged statement
is materially false and misleading, and it is no defense to such claim to assert that the
merger terms are fair; Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), where the
named plaintiff in a derivative action was not required to have personal knowledge of the
wrongs alleged in order to verify the complaint pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (now
Rule 23.1).

It should be noted that by the time of the Mills decision, supra, Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Fortas had been succeeded by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall.
4. 533 F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1976) (No. 75-1753).
5. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For additional
facts see Concord Fabrics Inc., Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders, March 17, 1975
[hereinafter cited as Shareholders Notice]; People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d
120, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).

6. Shareholders Notice, supra note 5, at 2.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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In order to carry out the proposed transaction the Weinsteins
formed their own private holding company, AFW Fabric Corporation ("AFW"), in January 1975. The Weinsteins put all their
Concord stock-,226,549 shares-into the holding company,
which was then going to merge with Concord. As a result of the
merger, each public, i.e., non-Weinstein, shareholder of Concord
would receive $3 per share; the Weinsteins would receive
1,226,549 shares of Concord, which is what they had owned after
their 1969 sale. The effect of the AFW-Concord merger would be
to eliminate the public's interest in Concord at $3 per share. To
those who had purchased the stock at $15 or $20 per share a few
years earlier, Concord's announcement that all their stock was
being redeemed at $3 per share was a sober reminder of the hazards and vagaries of Wall Street trading.
Several shareholders sought to enjoin the merger in federal
court, framing their complaints in the fraud and manipulation
language of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5.1 These shareholders claimed that it was a fraud and
manipulation to "go public" at $15 and $20 per share and then,
several years later, to "go private" at $3 per share. It must be
emphasized that plaintiffs did not allege that the Weinsteins or
Concord had made any materially false or misleading statements
in connection with the proposed AFW-Concord merger. Indeed,
obviously relying on Popkin v. Bishop,"0 the proxy statement issued by defendants in connection with the merger was a confession of the penitent. The company acknowledged and proclaimed
that there was no corporate purpose to the merger. It admitted
that the only purpose of the merger was to benefit the Weinsteins,
who would be able to transmute their 68 percent interest in Concord into 100 percent without any additional personal invest9. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1971). SEC Rule 10b-5 was adopted in 1942 by the Commission
under the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), on the
basis of a recommendation by the staff. The rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
10. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ment. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for an injunction, holding that "Rule 10b-5 simply does not encompass these
alleged wrongs."" The district court held that appraisal under
state law was the only remedy available to dissatisfied Concord
shareholders. Furthermore, the district court relied on the report
submitted by the investment banking house of Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc., which had formally advised
Concord "that a price of
' 2
$3 per share is fair and equitable." '

The Shearson Hayden Stone report, in the form of a letter
to Concord's board of directors, stated: 3
Based upon our review and analysis as set forth above, it is our
opinion that a price per share of $3.00 is fair and equitable with
respect to public shareholders.
The merger would have been consummated on April 1, 1975,
except that the Attorney General of the State of New York obtained an injunction in state court'4 which was upheld on appeal. The state trial court noted that "it appears that the appraiser was the son of a director of Concord."'" The New York
State Attorney General was proceeding under the Martin Act,
Article 23-A of the New York General Business Law. 7 The relevant provision, section 352 of the General Business Law, empowers the Attorney General to act against anyone who is "about to
employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud" the investing
public.' 8 The language, of course, is the same as that of Rule 10b11. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
12. Shareholders Notice, supra note 5, at 5.
13. Letter from Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. to the Board of Directors, Concord
Fabrics Inc., Feb. 5, 1975, Shareholders Notice, supra note 5, exhibit 8.
14. People v. Concord Fabrics Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975).
15. People v. Concord Fabrics Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't
1975).
16. People v. Concord Fabrics Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 554 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
17. The statute, originally enacted in 1921, is New York's Blue Sky Law.
18. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352.1 (McKinney 1968). The purpose of the Martin Act
was described in People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38-39, 154 N.E. 655, 657
(1926):
The purpose of the law is to prevent all kinds of fraud in connection with
the sale of securities and commodities and to defeat all unsubstantial and visionary schemes in relation thereto whereby the public is fraudulently exploited.
(Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539). The words "fraud" and "fraudulent
practice" in this connection should, therefore, be given a wide meaning so as to
include all acts, although not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance
to perpetrate fraud or injury upon others, which do by their tendency to deceive
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5, the federal antifraud provision."9 The court carefully noted that

"[tihe fraudulent practices, which are the target of the Martin
Act, need not be fraud in the classic sense .... ,,20
The court
then concluded that, notwithstanding "that full disclosure of the
aims of the Weinstein group have been articulated," the proposed
21
AFT-Concord merger would be enjoined:
What is disquietingly evident here is the fact that a group of
insiders who are directing the reacquisition program, even controlling the appraisal of the stock[,] are the very ones who
made the company public originally, and will be the surviving
shareholders in the proposed privately-held enterprise. Adding
to the odium of the scheme is that fact that no real corporate
purpose has been demonstrated and that the credit of a now
public corporation will be used to finance a merger for the benefit of a private group.
Equity mandates fairness in all human transactions.
In the federal court litigation, plaintiffs appealed the district
court's adverse ruling. The Second Circuit unanimously re2
versed:
We hold that when controlling stockholders and directors of a
publicly-held corporation cause it to expend corporate funds to
force elimination of minority stockholders' equity participation
for reasons not benefiting the corporation but rather serving
only the interests of the controlling stockholders such conduct
will be enjoined pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which
prohibits "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud .. .in connection with the

purchase or sale of any security."
In short, the court of appeals labeled the Concord-AFW merger
a "scheme to defraud," hence a violation of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. In so doing, the court noted:?
The controlling shareholders of Concord have devised a scheme
to defraud their corporation and the minority shareholders to
or mislead the purchasing public come within the purpose of the law.
19. For the text of Rule 10b-5 see note 9 supra.
20. People v. Concord Fabrics Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 124, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 554 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
21. People v. Concord Fabrics Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 554
(1975).
22. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1281 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 12, 1976) (No. 75-1782).
23. Id. at 1282.
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whom they owe fiduciary obligations by causing Concord to finance the liquidation of the minority's interest with no justification in the form of a valid corporate purpose. The federal securities law does not confer jurisdiction for instances of corporate
mismanagement or self-dealing absent fraud intrinsic to a securities transaction. Here, however, a purchase and sale of securities is at the heart of the fraudulent scheme.
B.

The Santa Fe Merger

The facts in Green are more prosaic. 4 Santa Fe Industries, a
Delaware corporation, owned 95 percent of Kirby Lumber Corporation. It opted for a short-form merger under Delaware law
which would automatically extinguish the interests of the minority shareholders. 5 According to the terms of the Santa Fe-Kirby
Merger, Kirby's public (i.e., non-Santa Fe) shareholders would
receive $150 per share; those dissatisfied could seek an appraisal
6
under section 262 of the Delaware Corporation Law .
Shareholders of Kirby Lumber Company sued in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The essence of plaintiffs' claim was
that the merger served no legitimate corporate purpose, and that
the financial statements issued by Santa Fe in connection with
the proposed merger showed that Kirby Lumber had a book value
of $772 per share. Plaintiffs did not allege that they had been
given false or misleading information; indeed, they were relying
on the data circulated by Santa Fe.
Defendants moved under Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) for
an order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.
Interpreting Popkin v. Bishop27 to mean that deception was the
sine qua non of a Rule 10b-5 action, the district court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss.2 In the background was the fact
that the investment banking house of Morgan Stanley & Co. had
29
concluded that $125 per share was fair.
24. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25. The effect of a merger pursuant to section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law
is discussed in Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
26. It has been held that one who seeks an appraisal does not thereby waive any rights
under the federal securities laws. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Merrit
v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1972); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del.
1965).
27. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
28. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
29. Id. at 851. The opinion of investment bankers has not always proven to be a sure
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The circuit court, which had reversed the Concord case five
days earlier, again reversed the district court. The court of appeals held that a good claim under Rule 10b-5 is asserted if it is
alleged that (a) there is no justifiable business purpose for the
merger and (b) the price offered the shareholders "is substantially lower than the appraised value reflected in the Information
Statement.

'3°

Whether or not a charge of inadequate considera-

tion alone would suffice to state a claim under section 10(b) remains an open question.
Judge Moore raised several points in his vigorous dissent. He
argued that since "the sovereign state of Delaware" 31 had enacted
the short-form merger statute in its "legislative wisdom,13 2 Erie

R.R. Co. v. Tompkins3 prevents a federal court from positing
standards of4fiduciary conduct which are inconsistent with those
3
of the state.

Stating that "the essence of fraud is deliberate deception or
concealment,"35 Judge Moore further argued that no section 10(b)
action can lie where the material facts are fairly revealed. Thus,
even if one were to assume that the Kirby Lumber financial statements showed that the shares were each worth $772 (whereas
Santa Fe was offering $150 per share), that discrepancy alone
would not create a section 10(b) claim. In contrast with Judge
Moore's restrictive views on a cause of action under Rule 10b-5
guide to a stock's value. When National Student Marketing Corporation proposed a
merger with Interstate National Corporation, whereby Interstate's shareholders would
receive National Student Marketing's stock, Interstate sought the opinion of the investment banking firm of White, Weld & Co. In a report dated Sept. 22, 1969, White, Weld
& Co. rendered its opinion that the terms of the merger were fair. SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973). The merger was consummated on Oct.
31, 1969, at which time National Student Marketing's stock was trading at approximately
$50 per share. Subsequently, the SEC, in a complaint, alleged that National Student
Marketing's financial statements were materially false and misleading and that much of
its reported business was nonexistent. The complaint is set forth at [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,360. As noted at paragraph eight of the complaint,
the stock had declined to approximately $2.25 per share as of Feb. 1, 1972 (immediately
prior to the filing of the SEC complaint).
Most merger terms are approved by an investment banking firm. If such approvals
were given substantial weight, the issues before the court would be considerably narrowed.
30. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No. 75-1753).
31. Id. at 1300 (Moore, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
34. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1307 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No. 75-1753).
35. Id. at 1301.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 7

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1976]

is the majority opinion which held that a federal claim was stated
if, in addition to a gross discrepancy, the complaint alleged that
no corporate purpose was served by the merger. Judge Moore's
final point was that, absent fraud, appraisal
is "both adequate
36
and exclusive" under the Delaware law.
As previously noted, the Second Circuit denied an en banc
review of the Concord and Santa Fe cases "because they are of
such extraordinary importance"3 that they merit Supreme Court
review. The court's decisions in Concord and Santa Fe, however,
focus basically on one issue presented by the two cases: whether
there can be a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if all
material facts are disclosed. In effect, is there a fraud or manipulation under the statute if shareholders are told in plain language
that they are being cheated? Judge Moore would maintain that
the appraisal remedy offers a complete defense against that
wrong. The effectiveness of that remedy will be examined later.
Before debating the pros and cons of the Concord and Santa Fe
opinions in the narrow light of Popkin, it may be fruitful to look
at those decisions from a different vantage point.

III.

THE COMMON LAw BACKGROUND

In analyzing whether the wrongs alleged in Concord and
Santa Fe violated the federal securities laws, it might be well to
examine first the alleged wrongs in the broad context of a common law principle that evolved in the 1920's and 1930's. Specifically, may fiduciaries terminate their cestui que trust's investment in midstream? A discussion of that principle necessarily
involves these questions: Who owns a company? What is a company? Can one separate a company's past and present from its
future, giving the public only the "has been" and the "now," but
giving to the corporate insiders its tomorrow and its hopes?
Meinhard v. Salmon is best known for its oft-quoted language
describing fiduciary duties: 39
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1309.
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
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As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions (Wendt v. Fischer), 243 N.Y. 439, 444. Only thus has
the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher
than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.
The facts in Meinhardbear an interesting relationship to the
facts in Concord and SantaFe. Meinhard invested in a real estate
venture which Salmon managed. The subject of the investment
was a 20-year lease that terminated in 1922. The enterprise first
faltered, then became profitable. "For each, the venture had its
phases of fair weather and of foul. The two were in it jointly, for
better or for worse." 40 Toward the end of the lease, a third party
approached Salmon, the managing partner of the venture, with
plans to develop the site when the lease period ended. Salmon
and the third party thereupon contracted to develop the site.
Although Salmon's new contract was to begin only when the lease
that he and Meinhard jointly held had ended, the court nonetheless found that Meinhard's interest could not be extinguished:
"Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another while the
enterprise continues the duty of the finest loyalty."'" Although
the opinion is couched in the technical language of real estate, the
effect of the holding in Meinhard is this: an investor under the
common law cannot have his interest snuffed out by the will of
those who manage the business. As the court in Meinhard

expressed

it:42

To say that a partner is free without restriction to buy in the
reversion of the property where the business is conducted is to
say in effect that he may strip the good will of its chief element
of value, since good will is largely dependent upon continuity of
possession. Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified transactions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and
unselfish. Certain at least it is that a "man obtaining his locus
standi, and his opportunity for making such arrangements, by
the position he occupies as a partner, is bound by his obligation
to his co-partners in such dealings not to separate his interest
from theirs, but, if he acquires any benefit, to communicate it
to them." Certain it is also that there may be no abuse of special
40. Id. at 462, 164 N.E. at 546.

41. Id. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546.
42. Id. at 467, 164 N.E. at 547-48 (citations omitted).
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opportunities growing out of a special trust as manager or agent.
If conflicting inferences are possible as to abuse or opportunity,
the trier of the facts must make the choice between them. There
can be no revision in this court unless the choice is clearly
wrong. It is no answer for the fiduciary to say "that he was not
bound to risk his money as he did, or to go into the enterprise
at all." . . . "He might have kept out of it altogether, but if he
went in, he could not withhold from his employer the benefit of
the bargain."
We have no thought to hold that Salmon was guilty of a
conscious purpose to defraud.
We note that Meinhard was held to have an interest in the
continuing enterprise, even though the specific 20-year lease in
which he had invested had ended. A fortiori, an investor should
be protected when he invests in an enterprise, such as Concord
Fabrics or Kirby Lumber Company, which appears to have a
permanent existence.
The same general result that was reached in Meinhard was
asserted in Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch," where a corporation
(Acoustic) had the opportunity to invest in a company that
owned patents which were essential to Acoustic's business. But
according to Acoustic's directors, the company "by reason of its
financial straits had neither the funds nor the credit to make the
purchase." The directors, who had the means, bought the stock
for themselves. The directors were sued for breaching their fiduciary duty to the company. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
reversing the lower court, held that Acoustic could recover from
the directors any profit that had been made from their purchase
of the stock. As for defendants' argument that the corporation
was unable to make the purchase, the court held:"
If directors are permitted to justify their conduct on such a
theory, there will be a temptation to refrain from exerting their
strongest efforts on behalf of the corporation since, if it does not
meet the obligations, an opportunity of profit will be open to
them personally.
Irving Trust is important to the cases at bar because the
court held, in effect, that investors were protected against their
directors who would personally attempt to divert business opportunities that became available to their corporation. An investor
43. 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
44. Id. at 124.
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is entitled to partake in the enterprise and all its hopes for the
future; the directors, as fiduciaries acting on behalf of the shareholders, cannot announce that, henceforth, the entire enterprise
is theirs. Since the directors could not divert a business opportunity to themselves even where the company was in a dire financial
condition, surely the fiduciaries in Concord and Santa Fe ought
not have been allowed to divert those opportunities to themselves
at a time when those companies were continuing on their own, if
not prospering.
The same broad result was, arguably, reached in Perlmanv.
Feldmann" where a controlling insider sold his stock at a large
premium. The Second Circuit held that, in effect, the insider had
trafficked for his own profit in an asset that belonged to his company, the Newport Steel Corporation. The asset, however, was
an intangible one: Newport Steel's ability, in a period of steel
shortage occasioned by the Korean War, "to build up patronage"
so that it could compete when the war conditions ended. The
court held that since a fiduciary could not divert such a corporate
opportunity to himself, he could not sell that corporate opportunity to others. In Concord and Santa Fe, the fiduciaries bought,
rather than sold, the intangible corporate asset that is at the
heart of Perlman. That is, in both Concord and Santa Fe the
fiduciaries bought for themselves all the future business opportunities that, arguably, they should have shared with the minority shareholders.
One other case relevant to this issue is Guth v. Loft.4 Guth
controlled Loft, a large retailer of candies and other sweets. He
also invested in Pepsi Cola, then a struggling syrup maker; access
to Loft's retail outlets would make the struggle easier. And so
Guth, seeing that Pepsi Cola had a future that was "bubblier"
than its past, became a large owner of Pepsi stock. A shareholder
of Loft sued in the Delaware Chancery Court alleging that the
opportunity to own Pepsi belonged not to Guth, but to Loft. After
reciting the broad rule of fiduciary duties, the court held that no
officer or director can compete with his own company for a business opportunity. All such opportunities belong, necessarily, to
the corporation. Hence Guth had to return to Loft his full interest
in Pepsi, which had grown during the course of the litigation into
a large and prospering company.
45. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
46. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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The essence of Guth is that a fiduciary cannot take business
opportunities for himself that might be profitable to his company.
In Santa Fe and Concord the entire future of the business was
simply bought by the controlling insiders at a price that reflected,
not the value of the businesses being bought, but a deep and
broad stock market decline.
It is recognized, of course, that Meinhard, Irving Trust,
Perlman and Guth involved factual situations wholly different
from the facts of the two cases being discussed. But one underlying theme is expressed throughout: minority investors have the
right to share in their company's future. That right is dramatically underscored in Concord. In February 1975, when the announcement of the AFW-Concord merger was made, Concord's
stock was selling at about $2 per share on the American Stock
Exchange. The proxy statement dated March 17, 1975, reported
earnings that were spotty at best; it described earnings for the 13week period ending December 1, 1974, in this unenthusiastic
way:

47

The decrease in profits for the 13 weeks ended December 1, 1974
from the comparable prior period was primarily attributable to
a reduction in the gross profit margin from 23.9% to 17.7%,

which, in management's opinion, was caused principally by a
mark-down of knit and woven inventories to reflect lower replacement costs during the period and also by a general weakness in selling prices due to severe competition and customer
resistance to prices. The provision for doubtful accounts was
increased after a review of the accounts receivable in light of
uncertain economic conditions.
Specifically, Concord's earnings for the December 1, 1974, quarter were reported to be 1 cent per share, compared to the 23 cents
earned in the like period in 1973. The proxy statement, although
reporting improved earnings in early 1975, depicted Concord
rather sorrowfully. Although Concord's stock price was, necessarily, affected by the general stock market malaise, a reader
of Concord's March 17, 1975, proxy statement might conclude
that Concord's prospects were not dramatically undervalued by
the stock market price of $2 per share.
The plan was to effect the AFW-Concord merger by April 1,
1975; thereafter, Concord would no longer report its earnings publicly, and no one would know whether its fortunes were up or
47. Shareholders Notice, supra note 5, at 13.
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down. But the merger was thwarted by the state court injunction,
and Concord has reported its postproxy statement results: for the
13 weeks ended June 1, 1975, earnings were 49 cents per share,
compared with 16 cents per share in the 1974 period. 8 For the 13week period ended November 30, 1975, Concord's earnings were
$1.03 per share, or 103 times the 1 cent per share reported for the
same quarter in 1974.11 As Judge Cardozo wrote in Meinhard, an
investor and his manager are partners in "fair weather and...
foul."50 The wisdom of that decision is demonstrated in Concord,
where the public investors were to be squeezed out just when
earnings were about to soar. For the record, Concord's stock
reached 5% per share in 1975. Its 1976 high has been 167/8. For
the 12 months ended February 29, 1976, Concord earned $4.02 per
share,5' more than the $3 per share offered in the "going private"
merger. A cynic might wonder at the timing of that proposed
merger.
Concord and Santa Fe are not concerned, however, with
whether common law fiduciary duties have been violated, but
with whether the federal securities laws have been violated. Of
course, none of the foregoing corporate common law casesMeinhard, Irving Trust, Perlman or Guth-would have violated
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193452 or Rule 10b5, because in none of those cases did the corporation itself buy or
sell any security. Those cases have been discussed in order to
show that Concord and Santa Fe are but part of the long and
developing common law history dealing with fundamental questions: Who owns the corporation? How can control be bought or
sold? Who owns the corporation's opportunities? Although the
common law has raised serious questions about a fiduciary's right
to purchase a reluctant minority's shares, there is no question, of
course, that some state merger statutes may have given large
48. Wall St. J., July 9, 1975, at 18, col. 1.
49. Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1976, at 21, col. 4.
50. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 462, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
51. Concord earned 49 cents per share in the 13 weeks ended June 1, 1975 (Wall St.
J., July 9, 1975, at 18, col. 1.), $1.27 per share in the 13 weeks ended Aug. 31, 1975 (Wall
St. J., Nov. 18, 1975, at 36, col. 1.), $1.03 per share in the 13 weeks ended Nov. 30, 1975
(Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1976, at 21, col. 4.), and $1.24 per share in the 13 weeks ended Feb.
29, 1976 (Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1976, at 27, col. 1.). For the 12-month period, earnings round
out to $4.02 per share. It should be noted that Concord's business is, by its nature,
extremely cyclical, and the author knows of no evidence that Concord actually knew that
its earnings would increase.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1971).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 7

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1976]

shareholders the apparent right to merge small minorities out of
53
existence .
The merger statutes, such as those involved in Concord and
Santa Fe, are automatic. There is, typically, no hearing on fairness unless an appraisal right is sought. Although the State of
New York did enjoin the Concord-AFW merger, that remedy was
unique; in every other instance (unless there is deception and the
more typical proxy statement fraud) the merger is consummated
on whatever terms are proposed. Although Judge Moore's Santa
Fe dissent termed the appraisal remedy to be "both adequate and
exclusive," 54 it is, in fact, inadequate to the point of nonexistence.
IV.

THE APPRAISAL REMEDY

If the appraisal remedy were exclusive, there would be no
remedy at all for small shareholders. The SEC has long recognized the inadequacy of appraisal as a means of protecting the
interest of small dissenting shareholders: 5
[T]he remedy by appraisal is an inadequate one. The statutes
do not require that stockholders be informed of their right of
appraisal .... Even if stockholders are cognizant of their right
to an appraisal, the procedure prescribed by the statutes for
obtaining it is highly technical and costly. . . . "It is a remedy
which does not prevent or set aside inequitable corporate readjustments. ..."
The economic fact is that a small shareholder can rarely
challenge merger terms successfully in an appraisal proceeding.
The cost of experts and lawyers would exceed any possible benefit. In the Santa Fe-Kirby Lumber merger, for instance, a shareholder would have to establish the value of Kirby Lumber's natural resources, the value of Kirby Lumber as a going enterprise,
and the value of Kirby Lumber's securities under a variety of
conditions. An objecting shareholder would have to retain foresters, investment bankers, security analysts and industrialists to
testify. Under section 262(h) of the Delaware Corporation Code,
53. The 38 states with short-form merger statutes are listed in Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. granted,
45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No. 75-1753).
54. Id. at 1306.
55. Collins v. SEC, 532 F.2d 584, 592 (8th Cir. 1976), quoting SEC REPORT ON THE
STUDY OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES: ABUSES AND DEFICIENCIES IN THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES,

H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong.,

1st Sess. 1411, 1422 (1939-40).
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shareholders might also have to pay for "the cost of any appraisal,
including the reasonable expenses of the appraiser." In addition,
they would have to pay counsel, both in the appraisal proceeding
and on appeal to the courts. If there were an appeal, they would
have to pay for the printing of a voluminous record. Therefore,
appraisal is feasible only if the dissenting shareholders have a
substantial interest in the company, and if, in addition, they have
a substantial fund for prosecuting the case. It is a procedure
beyond the means of the ordinary shareholder.
The fact that the appraisal procedure is beyond the means
of most shareholders is not the only factor that makes appraisal
an inadequate remedy. More telling is the fact that the appraisal
remedy is not designed to protect a person shorn of his or her
stock. Judge Mansfield's opinion in Green makes a point that is
particularly relevant in terms of the common law cases Meinhard, Irving Trust, Perlman and Guth. He discusses the
Delaware appraisal statute, which he describes as "typical," in
the following terms: 56
Yet in determining the value of the "frozen out" shares, the
appraiser may not award the public shareholders any gain resulting from the merger itself or the expectation thereof...
The appraiser's focus must be entirely retrospective: "The determination must be based upon historical earnings rather than
on the basis of prospective earnings."
Thus the typical appraisal statute not only authorizes the extinguishment of all minority interests at any time suitable to the
controlling majority, but it also prevents the minority from receiving any compensation for future expectations. The appraisal
statutes, in that light, encourage controlling stockholders to
"squeeze out" the minority interests whenever it is expected that
the corporation's fortunes are going to improve. In the context,
for instance, of Concord's dramatically improved earnings after
its proposed merger was frustrated, it appears as if the appraisal
statutes afford no relief even to those who are rich enough to use
them. The diversion of corporate opportunities by fiduciaries,
without any payment to the minority, is diametric to the holdings
in Meinhard, Irving Trust, Perlman and Guth.
56. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1297 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield,
J., concurring), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No. 75-1753), quoting
Francis du Pont v. Universal City Studios, 312 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch. 1973).
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The "exclusive" appraisal remedy is, therefore, a nonexistent one. If a merger would be unfair to the minority shareholders,
there may be no meaningful remedy except as may be provided
by the federal securities laws.
V.
A.

THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

The Economic Purpose of the Laws

Although the common law recognizes an investor's right not
to have his or her interests purchased at the whim of a fiduciary,
state merger statutes appear to have limited the remedies available to a small dissenting shareholder. As a result, small shareholders have sought the protection of the federal securities laws.
The legislative history of those laws supports the argument that
the federal securities laws were enacted to remedy precisely this
type of wrong.
The broad purpose of the federal securities legislation was
to "foster a higher degree of public confidence in the stock exchange. . . ,,57
Public confidence had been eroded. The following facts were presented to the Congress during the debate on the
federal securities laws:5"
MR. PErrENGILL.

Mr. Chairman, from September 1929 to

June 1932 the market value of bonds listed on the New York
Stock Exchange alone depreciated $9,387,000,000. In this same
period of time and on that one exchange, brokers' loans were
liquidated to the extent of $8,308,000,000. In the same period of
time and on that one exchange only, of the twenty-and-odd
exchanges in the country, the market value of listed stocks
shrank $74,034,000,000. This is a total destruction of values and
liquidation in 34 months of $91,729,000,000 on one exchange ...
This loss and liquidation to the investors of America averaged $2,800,000,000 a month for 34 consecutive months. This
liquidation and destruction of values to the American investors
averaged $100,000,000 a day for 3 long years. . . .The loss was
three times the national debt, and it started in the New York
Stock Exchange because we did not have means to put a brake
upon that south sea bubble that has gone down into infamous
history as the Coolidge bull market.
The hopes of Congress were expressed on the floor of the House:"
57. 78 CONG. REC. 7925 (1934) (remarks of Mr. Chapman).
58. 78 CONG. REC. 7926 (1934) (remarks of Mr. Pettengill).
59. 78 CONG. REC. 7925 (1934) (remarks of Mr. Chapman).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss1/7

16

Rosenfeld: An Essay in Support of the Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel

Corporate Mergers and Rule 10b-5
It is believed that the enactment of this bill into law will
foster a higher degree of public confidence in the stock exchange
and help preserve it as a necessary and legitimate market place
for the sale of securities; will afford a larger measure of protection to honest corporate business; will make more secure the
holdings of the average citizen and insure greater confidence
and safety to the investor in securities.
The white light of publicity is the surest protection to the
public against manipulation of the market, the unfair practices
of designing men, and all the tricks of financial legerdemain
which scheming minds can devise.
Senator Fletcher stated: 0
We propose by this measure to establish, through Federal
regulation of the methods and the mechanical functions and
practices of the stock exchange, an efficient, adequate, open,
and free market for the purchase and sale of securities; also to
correct abuses we know of and others which may exist; to prohibit and prevent, if possible, their recurrence; to restore public
confidence in the financial markets of the country; to prevent
excessive speculation to the injury of agriculture, commerce,
and industry; to outlaw manipulation and unfair practices and
combinations by which to exploit the public and misrepresent
values, such as pools, wash sales, fictitious transactions, and the
like; to oblige disclosure of all material facts respecting securities traded on the exchanges, which disclosure is essential to
give the investor an adequate opportunity to evaluate his investment.
The Concord and Santa Fe decisions focus on the literal
meaning of the statutory words "fraud" and "manipulation." But
perhaps some attention should be given to the economic considerations raised by the extinguishment of all minority interests in
Concord Fabrics and Kirby Lumber Companies. Who would invest in a security if the issuing company had the unconditional
right to repurchase the security at any time at a price that reflected only market conditions at the time of repurchase? If a
company were to have an automatic call on its own stock, it is
doubtful that the company would be able to sell its stock in the
capital markets. The purchase of such a security, even if issued
by a thriving company with unlimited prospects, would be sheer
speculation. Certainly Concord could not have gone public at $15
60. 78 CoNG. REc. 8163 (1934) (remarks of Mr. Fletcher).
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per share if the public had considered that the stock might later
be repurchased at Concord's option, at a price which reflected
only the stock's then current (and fluctuating) market price.
If a call provision is not disclosed in the security, members
of the investing public have no reason to assume that such a right
exists. Indeed, part of the legislative history of the federal securities laws reveals the need to have stock prices geared to a company's business fortunes, not temporary market conditions. As
one report, submitted to Congress during discussion on the federal securities laws, stated:6
So far as possible, the aim should be to try to create a
condition in which fluctuations in security values more nearly
approximate fluctuations in the position of the enterprise itself
and of general economic conditions-that is, tend to represent
what is going on in the business and in our economic life rather
than mere speculative or "technical" conditions in the market ....
It is suggested here that if companies have the right to call their
own securities at any time at prices that relate only to stock
market prices, the capital markets could not function. This would
be particularly true with smaller companies where insiders often
hold a large percentage of the stock even after a public offering;
the ability and temptation for such companies to "go private" is
hence greater. As a result, smaller companies might find it even
more difficult to raise equity money. Viewed in this context, the
Concord and Santa Fe decisions correctly reflect one purpose of
the federal securities laws, that is, the stability of the capital
markets.
The legislative history of the securities acts also reveals a
specific wrong that, by analogy, is related to the wrongs alleged
in Concord and Santa Fe. One of the most distressing practices
uncovered by the Congressional investigations were pools. Pools
involved transactions whereby large investors bought and sold
large blocks of stock, taking advantage of swings in the market.
One pool, in the stock of Warner Brothers, is analogous to the
cases at bar:6"
61. 5 J. ELLENBEROER &E. MAHAR,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURMES

ACT OF 1933

& SECumTEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Dickerson Report at 5 (1973).

62. Hearings on S. Res. 84, and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 Before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 19 (1934).
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In the early part of 1930, Warner Bros. owned 303,480
shares of the company's stock. During the year 1930, in the
manner indicated, Warner Bros., sold 305,350 shares of their
stock at a price totaling $16,520,986; and they bought back
326,500 shares of stock at a price totaling $7,544,481.50, showing
a net profit to them on the transaction of $8,976,504.50 in cash
and an increase of their holdings of 21,150 shares which at the
then approximate value made an additional profit for them of
$274,950.
Without question, one of the vices of the Warner Brothers pool
was its secrecy. In Concord the defendants did not hide their
activities; rather, they proclaimed them. The final results, however, are not very different. In Warner Brothers, the corporation
made a profit of $8.9 million by buying and selling its own stock.
Concord and the Weinsteins sold 350,000 shares to the public at
a total price of $8.5 million; they wanted to buy it all back for
$1.5 million, which would have yielded a profit of $7 million. This
is not to suggest that Concord is as flagrant as the pools of the
1920's and 1930's. There is, nevertheless, a disquieting similarity
between them.
B.

Fraud and Manipulationin the Context of the Law

One of Judge Moore's main arguments in his dissent is that
deception is the essence of fraud. He maintained that since Kirby
Lumber's shareholders were given the facts, there was no deception; therefore, there was no section 10(b) violation. Shareholders
may have been cheated, but alas! they were not deceived. It is
here argued that such a narrow reading of the word "fraud" is
warranted neither by the language of section 10(b), by the definitions of "fraud" found in other contexts, nor by the development
of the securities laws themselves. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
The phrase "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" is clearly as all encompassing (but as imprecise) as any bill
that could have been drafted. "Manipulation," "deceptive device" and "contrivance" are somewhat like the term "pornography"-difficult to define precisely, but as Justice Stewart has
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said: "I know it when I see it." 3 By passing a broad but vague
law Congress most likely desired a flexible law. The "rules and
regulations" prescribed by the Commission-Rule 10b-5-are
no more precise. The prohibit "any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud," and "any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person."
Note that the word "fraud" does not appear in section 10(b),
but only in Rule 10b-5. The SEC, in adopting Rule 10b-5, was
clearly trying to go as far as Congress would allow in order to
outlaw "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."
Since the word "fraud" does not appear in the statute, it is not
logical to assume that the SEC sought to limit section 10(b) by
requiring a kind of deception that the statute itself does not require.
Furthermore, even the word "fraud," while it usually does
connote deception, is necessarily vague. As one court phrased it
in a criminal case: "The law does not define fraud, it needs no
definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human
ingenuity.""4 Since the federal laws were enacted as a protection
against "all the tricks of financial legerdemain which scheming
minds can devise,

'6 5 a

"scheme" in which the victims are forth-

rightly told that they are being despoiled ought not to be excluded
from the protection of the securities laws.
Although the term "fraud" has roots deep in the law, the
word "manipulation" has developed only as part of the securities
law."6 "Manipulation" is a species of "fraud" that describes the
63. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964).

64. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687
(1941).

65. See note 59 supra.
66. It is interesting to note that the term "fraud" is discussed for an entire page in
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) whereas no separate entry exists for the term
"manipulation." Similarly, there is no entry for the term in The Cyclopedic Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1922), or in The Collegiate Law Dictionary (1925). Only Ballentine's Law
Dictionary (3d ed. 1969) includes a separate entry for "manipulation." It is a reference,
however, to "manipulation of prices" as it pertains to the price of securities. There is no
reference to "manipulation" other than in the securities context.
The fixing of stock prices was described as "fraud" under the common law before the
term "manipulation" became a part of the federal securities acts. See Scott v. Brown,
[1892] 2 Q.B. 724, 733, where a contract to maintain a fictitious securities price was held
to be unenforceable as against public policy, although the word "manipulation" was not
used. See Harper v. Crenshaw, 82 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 298 US. 685 (1936);
Livermore v. Bushnell, 5 Hun 285 (N.Y. 1st Dep't 1875).
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fixing of securities prices at an artificial level. The legislative
history shows the context of the word: 7
To insure to the multitude of investors the maintenance of
fair and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds on
national exchanges are banned. The bill seeks to give investors
markets where prices may be established by the free and honest
balancing of investment demand with investment supply.
The purpose of the Act is . . . to purge the securities exchanges of those practices which have prevented them from fulfilling their primary function of furnishing open markets for
securities where supply and demand may freely meet at prices
uninfluenced by manipulationor control.
When the price of a stock declines precipitously, at least in
part because of a general stock market decline, it is, arguably, a
market "manipulation" to freeze the stock at a price that is historically low (in terms of price-earnings ratio, expectations, and
the other factors that contribute to the price of a stock) and force
all stockholders to sell their stock at the frozen price level. Such
a force-out is at odds with the "open market" required by the
antimanipulative language of Rule 10b-5. It is true that "manipulation" has usually been described as the clandestine fixing of
prices. But a manipulation that is bold and open has the same
effect; stock is bought or sold at an artificial price favorable to
the insider.
In order to come within the ambit of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the alleged wrong must involve (1) a security and (2) a
fraud, contrivance, manipulation or scheme. While Judge Moore
has sought to impose a very restrictive definition on the necessarily vague "fraud" and "manipulation" part of the equation, the
courts have been expansive in defining the heretofore rather precise word "security."
The Supreme Court, seeking a broad interpretation in order
to avoid making the securities laws too narrow a net, has cautioned against a strict definition of the term "security":"8
[T]he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and
commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever
they appear to be, are also reached . ...
67. United States v. Charnay, CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 95,560 at 99,788 (9th Cir.
1976) (emphasis added).
68. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
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More specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the definition
of "security"69
embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits.
In another case, the Supreme Court said:7 0
[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word "security" in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on economic reality.
If the rather technical word "security" can be reshaped in order
to comport with the spirit of the federal securities laws, why
should the vague words "fraud" and "manipulation" be given a
rigid interpretation that would defeat the spirit of those same
laws?
It is hard to see why individuals should be exempt from the
securities laws because they disclose outright, without being misleading, that they are taking advantage of defenseless shareholders. But Judge Moore's narrow view of "fraud" and "manipulation" is only a reflection of his narrow view of the federal securities laws.
V.

JUDGE MOORE'S JURISPRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS

Underlying Judge Moore's restrictive reading of the federal
securities laws is his basic philosophical argument against national encroachment in what he perceives as a local matter. This
is an argument, however, that was rejected when the securities
laws were enacted over 40 years ago.
Judge Moore argues that the legality of the proposed Santa
Fe-Kirby Lumber Company merger must be determined by the
"sovereign state of Delaware," citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.'
69. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
70. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 322, 336 (1967). For other cases which have
interpreted the word "security" broadly see SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); Movielab v. Berkey Photo Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971);
Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905
(1968); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 768 (1944).
But, of course, not every purchase involves an investment in a "security." See United
Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
71. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1307 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted,45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No. 75-1753), citing Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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We note, parenthetically, that Delaware was thought to have
surrendered her sovereignty in 1787, when it became the first
state to ratify the Constitution .1 2 As for the merit of the argument
that securities laws are inherently local, the same claim was made
in the 1930's by those who opposed enactment of the federal securities laws. The following colloquy took place between Senator
Carey and3Mr. Thomas Corcoran, one of the drafters of the securi7
ties laws:
SENATOR CAREY.

Does that mean that any law of New York

State affecting the New York Stock Exchange would become
inoperative after this law became effective?
MR. CORCORAN. Insofar as it was inconsistent with this
law.
SENATOR GORE. The bankruptcy law, for instance?
MR. CORCORAN. Like the Federal bankruptcy laws superseding State insolvency laws, the national law drives out all
systems in so far as they are inconsistent. That is a situation you
always have. A State can legislate additionally to the Federal
law, but it cannot legislate inconsistently with it.
Mr. Richard Whitney, president of the New York Stock Exchange, objected to the legislation by noting that if state "corporate procedures" were inadequate, Congress should pass "a national incorporation law applicable to all companies," rather than4
7
rely on securities laws to be administered by a federal agency.
A broad attack on the national power to regulate the stock market
was voiced by Thomas B. Gay, an attorney appearing on behalf
of the New York Stock Exchange, who relied upon the tenth
75
amendment of the Constitution as if McCulloch v. Maryland
78
had never been decided:
May I preface what I shall have to say by a reference to the
Tenth Amendment to our Federal Constitution, which provides
that-"The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively and to the people."
72. The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation,
Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., p. XL.
73. Hearings on S. Res. 84, and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 Before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. at 6577 (1934).
74. Id. at 6583-84.
75. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
76. Hearings on S. Res. 84, and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 Before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. at 6587 (1934).
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Because of this constitutional provision we have a dual system of government, dual in the sense that some powers are
delegated to and exercised by the Federal Government, and
those not so delegated are administered by the States through
the voice of the people.
Ours is not a national government. It is a Federal Government. It is not national in the sense that it possesses inherent
power. It is Federal in the sense that it exercises only delegated
power, powers which must be expressly found in the instrument
or necessarily implied for the purpose of exercising those expressly conferred.
The importance of keeping in mind these constitutional
principles is quite necessary it seems to me in view of Mr. Corcoran's explanation of the objects of this bill.
Mr. Gay further noted that buying and selling of stock was "peculiarly local," hence not an appropriate concern for federal legisla77
tion:
The New York Stock Exchange is, of course, located on
Wall Street. The buying and selling of securities on that exchange is done by its members on the floor of the exchange. The
securities themselves which are so bought and sold are required
to be delivered and paid for through the Stock Securities Corporation, a subsidiary of the exchange, or at the offices of members
of the exchange within the immediate neighborhood. The business, in other words, is in the nature of its transaction peculiarly
local. I may also say that every bond listed on the exchange and
traded in by its members under the rules of the exchange must
be payable as to principal and interest in the city of New York;
and that every share of stock traded in by its members must be
capable of transfer and registration in the city of New York.
The question of whether securities legislation should be national in scope or local was settled when the laws were enacted
in the 1930's. With supersonic jets, high speed computers, composite tapes and as many as 30 million shares traded on a single
day on the New York Stock Exchange, the economy and the
securities market are now more national than ever. Judge Moore's
view that the federal securities laws should be subordinated to
local law is an argument that is at least 40 years too late. The fact
that 38 states have short-form merger statutes that might be
questioned if Concord and Santa Fe are affirmed is not relevant.
77. Id. at 6590.
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Either the challenged transactions violated federal law or they
did not; the fact that the mechanics of a merger are prescribed
by state laws ought not to make them immune from attack under
the federal laws.
In a recent case,"8 the Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia
statute that restricted the dissemination of drug price information, although it was argued that 33 other states had similar
statutes. By striking the Virginia law, the Court in effect struck
down the laws of 34 states. In Concord and Santa Fe the result
was less drastic; the merger statutes of New York and Delaware
were not challenged or declared illegal. Rather, the court held
that mergers which complied with those technical statutes were
not thereby necessarily immune from challenge under the federal
laws. As a significant purpose of the federal law is to provide a
single national standard for all securities transactions, how can
one justify the supremacy of local law?
This brings us to Erie.7" By citing Erie Judge Moore must
have meant that where a local law is applicable, the federal law
is inapplicable. Under that theory, the federal securities laws
would be superseded by the merger laws of 38 states and, possibly, by various provisions of the Blue Sky Laws of each of the 50
states. Yet, the purpose of Erie was to promote "uniformity in the
administration of the law."8 The thrust of Erie was not that
deference to local laws was an end in itself (as Judge Moore
suggests) but that there should be only one law governing. In
Erie, where the dispute involved a Pennsylvania common law rule
concerning the liability of the Erie Railroad to a person who
walked along the railroad tracks at Hughestown, Pennsylvania,
deference to Pennsylvania's local rule was clearly appropriate.
Not satisfied with that local common law rule, however, the lower
federal courts in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins had applied their
version of a "general law." The result was confusion because cases
in the federal court based upon diversity of citizenship applied
one rule, and cases in the state court applied another. In striving
for a uniform rule, Erie made the state common law rule applicable in the federal courts as well. Erie held that the law must be
applied uniformly, and thus supports the Second Circuit's decisions in Concord and SantaFe. The essence of Concord and Santa
78. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 423
U.S. 815 (1976).
79. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80. Id. at 75.
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Fe is that, as in Erie, there must be a uniform application of the
laws that does not vary with the forum.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Concord and Santa Fe are cases involving federal jurisdiction. The complaints allege that by virtue of corporate mergers,
minority shareholders are being grossly underpaid for shares that
they do not want to sell. The legislative history and case law
interpretation of the securities laws confirm that the federal securities laws apply to the wrongs alleged. Judge Moore's argument that without deception there is no federal jurisdiction is
premised on the availability of a fair appraisal. The appraisal
remedy, however, is clearly illusory. Therefore, in view of the
avowed purposes of the securities laws, investors who are being
forced to surrender their stock at unfair prices must be protected,
notwithstanding even the most revealing corporate disclosures.
Although the law is a maze of trends and crosscurrents, to argue
that the local rules of sovereign states should govern the legality
of securities transactions that result from mergers is to ignore
much that has taken place since the abandonment of the Articles
of Confederation.
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